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Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s
a version of a pair of cases aimed at supporting this: Bob and his wife are driving
home on Friday and considering whether to stop at the bank to deposit a check.
The lines at the bank are very long and so Bob considers coming back on Saturday.
In the low stakes version, nothing of importance hinges on whether the check
is deposited; in the high stakes version, it is very important that the check be
deposited. Bob’s wife asks whether the bank will be open on Saturday. Bob says
he drove past the bank last Saturday, and it was open. However, his wife points
out that banks sometimes change their hours. Bob says “I know the bank will be
open tomorrow”. In the low stakes case, many philosophers maintain that Bob does
indeed know that the bank will be open; in the high stakes case, these philosophers
maintain that Bob is ignorant – his statement that he knows the bank will be open
tomorrow is false. These philosophers also maintain that this pattern of judgments
is what we would expect from competent speakers confronted with this and similar
cases (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2013; DeRose, 1992, 2009; Fantl and McGrath, 2002;
Nagel, 2008; Rysiew, 2001; Stanley, 2005).
Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge
ascriptions, there is disagreement about what explains this. One view, epistemic
contextualism, holds that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth
conditions for knowledge ascriptions can vary across conversational contexts
(e.g., DeRose, 2009). For instance, Bob’s statement “I know the bank will be
open tomorrow” can be true in low stakes contexts and false in high stakes
contexts. Another view, interest-relative invariantism, denies that “to know” is a
context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions
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vary according to conversational contexts. Instead, cases like the Bank cases
show that practical factors—i.e., stakes—play a distinctive role in determining
whether the knowledge relation obtains (e.g., Stanley, 2005). Yet another alter-
native, which we’ll call classical invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context
sensitive verb and that practical factors, such as stakes, play a direct role in
determining whether the knowledge relation obtains. Instead, stakes affect
knowledge ascriptions only by affecting our assessment of factors that have
traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge, such as e.g.,
belief, quality of evidence, etc. (e.g., Bach, 2005; Weatherson, 2005; Ganson, 2007;
Nagel, 2008). If this is right, then the role of stakes in knowledge ascriptions fails
to motivate such surprising views as epistemic contextualism or interest-relative
invariantism. Naturally, epistemic contextualists and interest-relative invariantists
deny this, claiming that even when the factors that have traditionally been taken
to constitute or be necessary for knowledge are held fixed, stakes continue
to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g., DeRose, 2009; Lawlor,
2013).
So we see a dispute over what best explains the role of stakes in ordinary
knowledge ascriptions. It is thus extremely surprising that a wide range of empirical
evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail to display any sensitivity
to stakes (e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and
Zarpentine, 2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri,
2017; though see e.g., Pinillos, 2012; Pinillos and Simpson, 2014; Sripada and
Stanley, 2012). If stakes really do not play any role in ordinary knowledge
ascriptions, one of the main motivations for epistemic contextualism and
interest-relative invariantism would be undermined. Perhaps these different
explanations of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascription are born
out of nothing more than a myth (Schaffer and Knobe, 2012). If so, classical
invariantism about knowledge might be best supported—not because it provides
the best explanation of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions,
but rather because the failure of stakes to play a role in ordinary knowledge
ascription would undercut an important motivation for its two competitors,
epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. These radical alter-
natives to classical invariantism, lacking evidence in support of one of their
important motivations, should perhaps then fall. Classical invariantism would
stand.
In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epis-
temic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by
presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge
ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to im-
pact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another
look at classical invariantism.
Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous
research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is lit-
tle evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The
conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.
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1. Strengthening the Case for Stakes
The role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions is taken to be illustrated by
patterns of judgments allegedly made by competent speakers. While a number of
philosophers have taken for granted the sensitivity to stakes of knowledge ascription
among competent speakers, empirical evidence has suggested otherwise. A wide
range of empirical research has failed to uncover evidence that stakes play a role
in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (see below for discussion of evidence seemingly
supporting such a role). In light of this evidence, it would be tempting to conclude
that perhaps stakes do not, after all, play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription.
As tempting as this may be, however, it seems to us that there are a number of
issues that have yet to be addressed.
First, virtually every study exploring the role of stakes in knowledge ascription
has failed to ask participants whether they view the situation as a high or low stakes
situation. This is especially surprising given that the main finding is a null result
i.e., that knowledge ascriptions do not differ between high and low stakes cases.
It may well be that the manipulation—i.e., high vs. low stakes—was ineffective,
perhaps because participants failed to pay sufficient attention to key details varying
between the cases. For instance, in the Bank cases, it may be that participants fail to
appreciate that in one case it is “very important” that a check be deposited, while
in the other it is “not very important.” If so, then the fact that no stakes effect was
found wouldn’t show that competent speakers fail to display a sensitivity to stakes.
So, in the study reported below, the first question examined whether participants
have understood what was at stake.
Another, perhaps more serious issue is that some of the results suggesting that
stakes fail to play a role in knowledge ascriptions might be due to protagonist
projection. Protagonist projection occurs when a subject takes up a protagonist’s
perspective and imagines what seems true from the protagonist’s point of view
(Holton, 1997). Importantly, protagonist projection looks to be at least partly
responsible in producing otherwise surprising findings. For instance, Weinberg,
Nichols, and Stich (2001) present evidence that Westerners and East Asians view
Gettier cases differently: Westerners judge that protagonists in Gettier cases do
not know the relevant proposition while East Asians judge that protagonists in
Gettier cases do know the relevant proposition. But recent research suggests that
the differences uncovered by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich disappear when taking
into account participants’ tendency to engage in protagonist projection. Indeed,
recent work by Machery et al. (2015) found that, across four cultures—USA,
India, Japan, and Brazil—rates of knowledge denial when confronted with Gettier
cases were both high and similar across each of the four cultures sampled when a
question targeting protagonist projection was introduced. While some participants
attributed knowledge to a Gettierized protagonist when asked whether that
protagonist “knows” or “does not know,” when given a question aimed at probing
for protagonist projection—i.e., being asked whether the Gettierized protagonist
“really knew” or “didn’t really know but only thought she knew”—rates of
knowledge denial increased with the vast majority of participants indicating
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that the Gettierized subject “didn’t really know” but “only thought that she
knew” (see also Machery et al. forthcoming).
Similarly, protagonist projection also looks to be behind apparently non-factive
knowledge ascriptions such as “Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before
two Australian doctors in the early 1980s proved that ulcers are actually caused by
bacterial infection” (Buckwalter, 2014, p. 396). It is not the case that people accept
statements like this because they think that knowledge is non-factive. Instead, they
accept statements like this because they are engaging in protagonist projection by
imagining what seems true from the perspective of individuals prior to the discovery
that ulcers are caused by bacterial infection.
Recent work by Turri (2017) suggests that something like protagonist
projection—what he calls “deferral”—may play a crucial role in some of the cases
aimed at showing that stakes play a role in knowledge ascriptions. Instead of peo-
ple’s knowledge ascriptions shifting along with variations in stakes, people may
simply defer to others’ mental-state reports. For instance, in one version of the
Bank cases (but not in the version we used), the protagonist in the high stakes case
says, “I don’t know it will be open tomorrow,” while the protagonist in the low
stakes case says, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow” (see, e.g., DeRose, 2009,
2011). In this version of the Bank cases, agreement with both statements might
have nothing to do with a shift in stakes. Instead, people may naturally defer to the
mental state reports of others.
In addition to producing the misleading appearance of a stakes effect, protag-
onist projection can also mask a genuine stakes effect. This can happen when the
protagonist says in both conditions, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow,”
as is the case in the vignettes we used. To ensure that protagonist projection does
not mask any genuine effect of stakes, we introduced a probe aimed at capturing
whether participants are making genuine knowledge ascriptions or merely project-
ing: It contrasts “knows” and “thinks he knows, but doesn’t actually know.” By
comparing participants’ answer to this probe to their answers to a “know/does not
know” probe, we will also be able to examine the role of protagonist projection in
knowledge ascription in a context where stakes are manipulated.
Finally, the failure of stakes to play a role in knowledge ascription may only
reflect something peculiar about the practice of knowledge ascription within a
narrow linguistic community. Indeed, all of the empirical work done thus far has
been conducted with participants drawn from the USA. Perhaps a wide range
of other linguistic communities display a sensitivity to stakes. So we would like
to know whether the effect of stakes (or lack thereof) in knowledge ascription is
cross-culturally robust. Putting all of this together, our questions are:
 Is the difference in stakes appreciated by participants?
 Is the lack of a stakes effect due to protagonist projection?
 Is the effect of stakes (or lack thereof) in knowledge ascriptions cross-culturally
robust?
In taking these up, our strategy was to undertake a cross-cultural study, introducing
a number of measures aimed at addressing the questions under consideration in
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order to determine whether stakes sensitivity (or the lack thereof) reflects a core
aspect of folk epistemology.
2. A Study in Folk Epistemology
2.1. Method
We collected data from 4504 people across nineteen sites, spanning sixteen countries.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two conditions, a low or high
stakes version of a Bank case. Here is the low stakes version:
Bob and his wife are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They both received
some money earlier in the day, and so they plan to stop at the bank on the
way home to deposit it. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the
lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although
they generally like to deposit any money they receive at the bank as soon as
possible, it is not especially important in this case that it be deposited right away,
and so Bob suggests that they drive straight home and deposit their money on
Saturday morning. His wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow.
Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” Bob replies, “No, I know the bank will
be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It was open until noon.”
As a matter of fact, the bank will be open on Saturday morning.
And here is the high stakes version:
Bob and his wife are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They both received
some money earlier in the day and so they plan to stop at the bank on the way
home to deposit it. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines
inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. They have recently
written a very large and very important check. If the money is not deposited into
their bank account before Monday morning, the important check they wrote
will not be accepted by the bank, leaving them in a very bad situation. Bob
suggests that they drive straight home and deposit their money on Saturday
morning. His wife says, “Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of
banks are closed on Saturdays.” Bob replies, “No, I know it’ll be open. I was
just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It was open until noon.” As a matter of
fact, the bank will be open on Saturday morning.
To see whether stakes are appreciated, participants were first asked:
Comprehension: According to the story, which of the following statements is
correct? [It is not very important that Bob and his wife deposit their money/It
is very important that Bob and his wife deposit their money.]
They were then asked:
Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, when Bob says “I know the
bank will be open” is his statement true? [Yes, Bob’s statement is true./No, Bob’s
statement is not true.]
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Table 1. Demographic Information About the Study’s Participants Who Passed
Comprehension Including Countries in Which Data Were Collected, Nature of the Sample
(Students vs. Non-students) and Mode of Survey Administrations (Paper-pencil vs
Web-based, Volunteers vs. in Exchange for Compensation, Language of the Survey)
Sample Students Method Payment Language N
Europe
Bulgaria N Web-based Volunteers Bulgarian 327
France N Web-based Compensation & volunteers French 367
Germany N Web-based Compensation German 153
Italy Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Italian 139
Portugal Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Portuguese 139
Spain N Web-based Compensation Spanish 239
Switzerland N Paper-pencil & web-based Volunteers French 54
Switzerland Y Paper-pencil & web-based Compensation & volunteers French 30
UK N Web-based Compensation English 255
Middle East
Iran N Paper-pencil Volunteers Persian 164
Central & North America
Mexico N Paper-pencil Volunteers Spanish 133
USA N Web-based Compensation English 225
South America
Brazil Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Portuguese 135
East Asia
China Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Chinese, Traditional 128
Guangzhou China Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Chinese, Simplified 109
Mainland China N Web-based Compensation Chinese, Simplified 180
Hong Kong Y Web-based Compensation Chinese, Traditional 146
Japan N Web-based Compensation Japanese 151
Japan Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Japanese 165
Mongolia N Paper-pencil Volunteers Mongolian 115
South Asia
India Y Paper-pencil Volunteers Bengali 162
And finally to see if responses to Knowledge Attribution are due to protagonist
projection, we asked:
Strict Knowledge Attribution: In your personal opinion, which of the following
sentences better describes Bob’s situation? [Bob knows the bank will be open
on Saturday./Bob thinks he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, but he
doesn’t actually know it will be open.]1
The cases were translated into fourteen languages by competent native speakers
and presented in the respective native language for each group.
2.2. Results
First, do participants appreciate the difference in stakes? It turns out that they do.
Overall, 78% of participants passed Comprehension (see Table 1 for Demographics).
So we take our first concern—that participants may not be appreciating a difference
in stakes—to be resolved.
Next, do stakes affect Knowledge Attribution? Removing participants who failed
Comprehension, we analyzed responses from the remaining 3530 participants.
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Table 2. Effect of Stakes on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site (* = p < .05, ** = p <
.01, *** = p < .001)
Sample N X2 p-value Cramer’s V
Central and North America
Mexico 133 .000 .990 .001
USA 225 3.661 .056 .128
South America
Brazil 135 .318 .573 .049
Europe
Bulgaria 327 .084 .773 .016
France 367 2.990 .084 .090
Germany 153 .555 .456 .060
Italy 139 .117 .732 .029
Portugal 139 1.229 .268 .094
Spain 239 6.219 * .161
Switzerland 84 .841 .359 .100
UK 255 4.470 * .132
Middle East
Iran 164 .020 .889 .011
East Asia
China 128 .522 .470 .064
Hong Kong 146 .272 .602 .043
Guangzhou China 109 .690 .406 .080
Mainland China 180 1.345 .246 .086
Mongolia 115 .003 .959 .005
Japan 316 5.728 * .135
South Asia
India 162 1.747 .186 .104
Overall, we found a significant, but negligible effect of stakes on Knowledge
Attribution (X2(1, 3530) = 9.040, p < .01). Ascription of knowledge in the low
stakes condition (85%) is only 3% larger than in the high stakes condition (82%),
and its conventional effect size is very small (Cramer’s V = .051): On a standard
interpretation of conventional effect sizes (see Ellis, 2010) it does not even count as
small.2
More importantly, across sites we find virtually no evidence that stakes affect
knowledge attribution (see Table 2 and Figure 1).
Out of the nineteen sites sampled, only three (16%)—Spain, UK, and Japan—
displayed a significant, small-sized effect of stakes on knowledge ascriptions (the
data from the USA is also near significant; see Figures 2 and 3). Despite this, a
logistic regression model revealed that there was no interaction between stakes and
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Figure 1. Rates of Knowledge Attribution for High- and Low-Stakes Cases for Each Site
Figure 2. Difference Between Low and High Stakes Cases for Those Who Attributed Knowl-
edge on Knowledge Attribution
site on Knowledge Attribution, which suggests that there is surprising stability in
the lack of a stakes effect across sites (see Table 3).3
Moreover, these three linguistic communities, along with every other linguistic
community sampled, displayed overall high rates of knowledge attribution regard-
less of whether the case was low or high stakes (Figure 1). These results fit with a
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Figure 3. Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Stakes on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site
range of similar findings4 and extend the finding that stakes fail to play a role in
knowledge ascription to a range of linguistic communities across the globe.
Given that we find virtually no evidence of a stakes effect on Knowledge Attri-
bution, we want to know whether this may be due in part to protagonist projection.
We look at this in two ways, first, using our second measure (“Strict Knowledge
Attribution”). Overall, we again find a significant, but negligible effect of stakes
on Strict Knowledge Attribution (X2(1, 3522) = 10.451, p < .01). Ascription of
knowledge in the low stakes condition (63%) is only 5% larger than in the high
stakes condition (58%), and its conventional effect size is tiny (Cramer’s V = .054):
Again, on a standard interpretation of conventional effect sizes (see Ellis, 2010) it
does not even count as small.
Moreover, across sites, we continue to fail to find evidence of a stakes effect on
Strict Knowledge Attribution (see Table 4 and Figure 4).
Indeed, only two linguistic communities (11%)—Germany and USA—out of
the nineteen sampled displayed evidence of a significant, small-sized effect of
stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution (Figures 5 and 6). But despite this, there
was no interaction between stakes and site on Strict Knowledge Attribution
(see Table 5).5 So, on our first way of looking at whether a stakes effect might
be masked by projection, we find virtually no evidence that stakes affect knowledge
attribution.
On the second way of looking at whether the lack of a stakes effect might
be due to protagonist projection, we looked at whether there was an effect
of stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution among those who attributed knowl-
edge on Knowledge Attribution. Here we find a marginally significant effect
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Results for the Difference in “Knowledge” Answers to
Knowledge Attribution between the Low and High Stake Conditions (Reference Class:
France) (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001)
Sample B(SE) Wald X2 p-value Exp(B)
Central and North America
USA .231(.641) .130 .718 1.260
Mexico −.686(.579) 1.405 .236 .503
South America
Brazil −.942(.602) 2.445 .118 .390
Europe
Bulgaria −.614(.486) 1,601 .206 .541
France (Contrast) — — — —
Germany −4.12(.553) .556 .456 .662
Italy −.872(.666) 1.716 .190 .418
Portugal −1.237(.641) 3.723 .054 .290
Spain .162(.535) .091 .762 1.176
Switzerland −1.314(.798) 2.713 .100 .269
UK .142(.571) .061 .804 1.152
Middle East
Iran −.740(.535) 1.914 .166 .477
East Asia
China −1.041(.633) 2.706 .100 .353
Hong Kong −.360(.756) .227 .633 .697
Guangzhou China −1.110(.649) 2.924 .087 .329
Mainland China .564(.331) .000 .996 .000
Mongolia −.669(.589) 1.289 .256 .512
Japan .027(.507) .003 .957 1.027
South Asia
India −.077(.621) .015 .901 .926
(X2(1, 2923) = 3.567, p = .059, Cramer’s V = .035): Of those who attributed
knowledge on Knowledge Attribution in the high-stakes case, 68% selected “re-
ally knows” on Strict Knowledge Attribution; of those who attributed knowledge
on Knowledge Attribution in the low-stakes case, 71% selected “really knows” on
Strict Knowledge Attribution. This amounts to a mere 3% difference.
Yet again, across sites, we continue to find virtually no evidence of a stakes
effect on Strict Knowledge Attribution among those who attributed knowledge on
Knowledge Attribution (Table 6 and Figure 7).
On this way of looking at whether a stakes effect might be masked by projection,
we find that stakes had no significant effect in any site, and approached significance
in only two sites: Hong Kong and USA (Figures 8 and 9). Yet again, a logistic
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Table 4. Effect of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution for Each Site (* = p < .05, ** =
p < .01, *** = p < .001)
Sample N X2 p-value Cramer’s V
Central and North America
Mexico 131 1.740 .187 .115
USA 225 5.453 * .156
South America
Brazil 135 2.603 .107 .139
Europe
Bulgaria 327 .248 .618 .028
France 365 .505 .477 .037
Germany 151 3.860 * .160
Italy 139 .024 .878 .013
Portugal 139 .033 .856 .015
Spain 239 1.930 .165 .090
Switzerland 84 .350 .554 .065
UK 252 2.640 .104 .102
Middle East
Iran 164 2.159 .142 .115
East Asia
China 128 2.092 .148 .128
Hong Kong 146 2.776 .096 .138
Guangzhou China 109 .002 .969 .004
Mainland China 180 .479 .489 .052
Mongolia 116 .556 .456 .069
Japan 316 2.988 .084 .097
South Asia
India 162 .144 .704 .030
regression model revealed that there was no interaction between stakes and site (see
Table 7).6
Even on our second way of looking at whether a stakes effect might be masked
by projection, we continue to find virtually no evidence that stakes affect knowledge
attribution. We conclude that the lack of a stakes effect on knowledge ascriptions
cannot be dismissed by appealing to protagonist projection.
2.3. Discussion
Given these results and the wide swath of research indicating that stakes do not
play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription, the scales tilt against epistemic con-
textualism and interest-relative invariantism, at least to the extent that they attempt
to account for everyday knowledge ascription. One of the important motivations
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Figure 4. Rates of Strict Knowledge Attribution for High and Low Stakes Cases for Each
Site
Figure 5. Difference Between Low and High Stakes Cases for Those Who Selected “Really
Knows” on Strict Knowledge Attribution for Each Site
for these views—that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge attributions—is
undermined. These views are “idle hypotheses” (Turri, 2017).
Interestingly, stakes had a marginally significant effect on both Knowledge At-
tribution and Strict Knowledge Attribution among those who attributed knowledge
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Figure 6. Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution for Each
Site
on Knowledge Attribution for the USA sample. Stakes also had a significant, but
small effect for the Strict Knowledge Attribution question. Perhaps this explains
why some epistemologists who have alleged there is a stakes effect, the most
influential of whom are Americans, thought there was a stakes effect. In any case,
the small effect of stakes is a far cry from what we would expect if stakes played an
important role in knowledge ascription. On the whole, we find that there is surpris-
ing stability in the lack of a stakes effect on knowledge ascriptions across cultures.
3. Objections and Responses
3.1. Evidence for a Stakes Effect
Some experimental studies claim to have found some evidence for a stakes effect
(Pinillos, 2012; Sripada & Stanley, 2012). These results clearly conflict with our
findings as well as a range of other research. So perhaps there really is a genuine
stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription.
We are skeptical that these studies provide genuine evidence that there is a stakes
effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Pinillos (2012) gave people a case about an
individual, Peter, writing a paper for an English class. In the low stakes version, it is
not very important whether the paper has typos; in the high stakes version, it is very
important that the paper not have typos. Pinillos found that when participants were
asked, “How many times do you think Peter has to proofread his paper before he
knows that there are no typos?”, the median response was 2 in the low stakes version
while the median response was 5 in the high stakes version. Pinillos interprets this
as evidence that stakes do indeed affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions.
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Results for the Difference in “Knowledge” Answers to Strict
Knowledge Attribution between the Low and High Stake Conditions (Reference Class:
France) (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001)
Sample B(SE) Wald X2 p-value Exp(B)
Central and North America
USA .477(.375) 1.621 .203 1.611
Mexico .330(.458) .519 .471 1.390
South America
Brazil −.769(.445) 2.990 .084 .464
Europe
Bulgaria −.061(.339) .032 .857 .941
France (Contrast) — — — —
Germany .539(.443) 1.483 .223 1.715
Italy −.122(.429) .081 .776 .885
Portugal −.111(.437) .064 .800 .895
Spain .187(.360) .269 .604 1.206
Switzerland .090(.514) .031 .861 1.094
UK .248(.360) .473 .492 1.281
Middle East
Iran −.640(.402) 2.535 .111 .528
East Asia
China .364(.449) .656 .418 1.438
Hong Kong .450(.452) .991 .320 1.568
Guangzhou China −.191(.459) .173 .677 .826
Mainland China −.504(.536) .884 .347 .604
Mongolia −.481(.480) 1.009 .315 .618
Japan .334(.387) .747 .387 1.397
South Asia
India −.050(.415) .014 .905 .952
But Buckwalter (2014) and Buckwalter and Schaffer (2015) present compelling
evidence that the effect Pinillos found has nothing to do with knowledge. The
effect persists when “knows” in the probe Pinillos used is replaced with “believes,”
“guesses,” and “hopes.” Rather than being an effect on knowledge ascription, the
stakes effect Pinillos has uncovered is instead an effect on the modal expression
“has to” (Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015).
In Sripada and Stanley (2012), participants read about an individual, Hannah,
who is allergic to Mongolian pine nuts. She is having dinner at a Mongolian
restaurant, and the possibility is raised that there may be Mongolian pine nuts in
her dish. They found an effect of stakes on knowledge ascription in two separate
pairs of cases. However, the effect looks to be quite small in both cases (less than a
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Table 6. Effect of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution Among Those Who Attributed
Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution (* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001)
Sample N X2 p-value Cramer’s V
Central and North America
Mexico 92 1.448 .229 .125
USA 202 3.182 .074 .126
South America
Brazil 110 2.303 .129 .145
Europe
Bulgaria 245 .056 .812 .015
France 333 .003 .995 .003
Germany 109 1.351 .245 .111
Italy 122 .095 .758 .028
Portugal 120 .650 .420 .074
Spain 190 .297 .586 .040
Switzerland 74 .724 .395 .099
UK 218 1.327 .249 .078
Middle East
Iran 118 2.013 .156 .131
East Asia
China 107 .613 .434 .076
Hong Kong 134 3.581 .058 .163
Guangzhou China 90 .356 .551 .063
Mainland China 179 .210 .617 .034
Mongolia 80 1.074 .300 .116
Japan 249 .034 .854 .012
South Asia
India 139 .416 .519 .055
1 point scale difference on a 7 point scale).7 Moreover, when inspecting the graphs of
their results (2012, 15), the mean responses in both the low and high stakes version
for both pairs of cases do not seem to be significantly different from the midpoint
of “neutral.” That is, in the cases used by Sripada and Stanley, participants are
actually neutral about whether to ascribe knowledge in both the high and low
stakes versions of these cases. Stakes may have an effect, a small one at that, only
when people are uncertain about ascribing knowledge. We doubt that these results
are very encouraging to proponents of epistemic contextualism and interest relative
invariantism since “[t]hey remain a far cry from the strong flip from “knowledge” to
“ignorance” which DeRose, Stanley and many other epistemologists had predicted
from the armchair . . . ” (Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015, 221). Moreover, there is
good empirical reason for thinking that the “stakes effect” Sripada and Stanley
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Figure 7. Rates of Strict Knowledge Attribution for High and Low Stakes Cases Among
Those Who Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site
claim to have uncovered is confounded with salience and that the effect is instead
a salience effect and not a stakes effect (see Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015).
3.2. The Role of Linguistic Evidence
Proponents of contextualism or interest-relative invariantism may object that
their theories are not meant to account for everyday knowledge ascriptions. They
are, after all, theories of knowledge, rather than linguistic theories about “to
know.”
We have two brief responses to this concern. To the extent that contextualism and
interest-relative invariantism are not meant to account for knowledge ascriptions—
perhaps they are theories of knowledge to be developed largely independently
of how people talk about knowledge and what they think about it—then, we
acknowledge, our findings have little to say about contextualism and interest-relative
invariantism. They are only relevant for those philosophical views that aim at
accounting for everyday knowledge ascription.
We add that as a matter of fact, many contextualists and interest-relative in-
variantists propose to account for everyday knowledge ascription. DeRose (1992)
formulates contextualism as a semantic theory and he engages with the early ex-
perimental philosophy literature on stakes effects in bank cases (2011). Moreover
DeRose (2009) is explicit that “[t]he best grounds for accepting contextualism comes
from how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in or-
dinary, non-philosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as ‘knowledge’
in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others” (p. 47). Ludlow
(2005, 11) too explicitly formulates contextualism as a semantic thesis: “According
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Figure 8. Difference Between Low and High Stakes Cases for Those Who Selected “Really
Knows” on Strict Knowledge Attribution Among Those Who Attributed Knowledge on
Knowledge Attribution for Each Site
Figure 9. Effect Size (Using Cramer’s V) of Stakes on Strict Knowledge Attribution Among
Those Who Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge Attribution for Each Site
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Table 7. Logistic Regression Results for the Difference in “Knowledge” Answers to Strict
Knowledge Attribution among those that Attributed Knowledge on Knowledge
Attribution between the Low and High Stake Conditions (Reference Class: France) (* = p
< .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001)
Sample B(SE) Wald X2 p-value Exp(B)
Central and North America
USA .523(.417) 1.572 .210 1.688
Mexico .570(.568) 1.009 .315 1.769
South America
Brazil −.613(.488) 1.577 .209 .542
Europe
Bulgaria .048(.393) .015 .903 1.049
France (Contrast) — — — —
Germany .641(.640) 1.004 .316 1.899
Italy .102(.477) .046 .831 1.107
Portugal .329(.516) .407 .524 1.389
Spain .147(.413) .126 .723 1.158
Switzerland .415(.583) .506 .477 1.514
UK .317(.407) .606 .436 1.373
Middle East
Iran −.544(.470) 1.337 .248 .580
East Asia
China .309(.504) .374 .541 1.361
Hong Kong .776(.551) 2.301 .129 2.173
Guangzhou China .248(.528) .221 .638 1.282
Mainland China −.239(.565) .178 .673 .788
Mongolia −.500(.549) .829 .363 .607
Japan .058(.493) .014 .906 1.060
South Asia
India −.274(.492) .310 .578 .760
to the thesis of contextualism in epistemology, many of our knowledge attributions
(including self-attributions) are context sensitive.”
3.3. A Negative Result Limited to the Bank Cases
One might argue that our results merely show that the bank cases are inappropriate
to elicit a stakes effect, not that there is no stakes effect. Other cases would elicit
a stakes effect. However, the bank cases were put forward by some advocates of
the view that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions as being the best cases
for eliciting a stakes effect (Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015, 222). Furthermore, even
Sripada and Stanley, who think that their pine nut cases are the best cases for
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eliciting a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription, find at best a very small
effect of stakes, which shifts people from being slightly more to slightly less neutral
about whether to ascribe knowledge. Finally, other studies have used a range of cases
with each failing to uncover an effect of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascription
(see e.g., Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; Turri, 2017; Turri and Buckwalter, 2017).
Indeed, in light of our findings and a range of research failing to uncover a stakes
effect in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, we think that stakes fail to reflect a core
aspect of folk epistemology.
4. Conclusion
Epistemic contextualists hold that knowledge ascription shifts across conversa-
tional contexts; interest-relative invariantists recognize a distinctive epistemic role
for practical factors such as stakes in knowledge ascription. If either of these is cor-
rect, serious pressure is put on classical invariantism since the classical invariantist
rejects both claims. However, a wide range of empirical evidence now suggests that
stakes do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascription.
We set out to provide what we take to be a stringent test of whether stakes
play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions. In doing so we pursued three main
questions:
 Is the difference in stakes appreciated by participants?
 Is the lack of a stakes effect due to protagonist projection?
 Is the effect of stakes (or lack thereof) in knowledge ascriptions cross culturally
robust?
Our results indicate that subjects do indeed appreciate the difference in stakes, that
a stakes effect is not being masked by protagonist projection, and that the lack of a
stakes effect in ordinary knowledge ascription is cross-culturally robust. In light of
our evidence and a wide range of previous empirical findings on the role of stakes
in knowledge ascription, one of the core motivations for epistemic contextualism
and interest relative invariantism is undercut. Although we won’t defend this claim
in detail here, we conclude that classical invariantism should be taken seriously,
now that its challengers have been undermined.8
Notes
1 There was a slight difference in the translation of this question in the low and high stakes cases for
the Japanese version. The low stakes version read as reported above but the high stakes version used,
“Of the following two sentences, which do you think better describes Takeshi’s situation?”.
2We follow Ellis (2010) in interpreting the magnitude of the effect sizes. For Cramer’s V we interpret
values greater than or equal to .5 as large, greater than or equal to .3 but less than .5 as medium, and
greater than or equal to .1 but less than .3 as small.
3 A logistic regression model with stakes, site, and an interaction between stakes and site on Knowl-
edge Attribution was run. Stakes did not predict Knowledge Attribution, Wald X2 = 2.897, p = .089;
site significantly predicted Knowledge Attribution, Wald X2 = 65.376, p = .000; and, using France as the
contrast class, there was no significant interaction between stakes and site on Knowledge Attribution,
Wald X2 = 22.314, p = .218.
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4 See e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May,
Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, 2017.
5 A logistic regression model with stakes, site, and an interaction between stakes and site on Strict
Knowledge Attribution was run. Stakes did not predict Strict Knowledge Attribution, Wald X2 = .505,
p = .478; site significantly predicted Strict Knowledge Attribution, Wald X2 = 139.090, p = .000; and,
using France as a contrast class, there was no significant interaction between stakes and site on Strict
Knowledge Attribution, Wald X2 = 22.071, p = .223.
6 A logistic regression model with stakes, site, and an interaction between stakes and site was run.
Among those who attributed knowledge on Knowledge Attribution, Stakes did not predict Strict Knowl-
edge Attribution, Wald X2 = .003, p = .955; site significantly predicted Strict Knowledge Attribution
Wald X2 = 99.536, p = .000; and, using France as a contrast class, there was no significant interaction
between stakes and site on Strict Knowledge Attribution Wald X2 = 17.307, p = .502.
7We say it “looks” small because we can’t actually calculate the effect size since Sripada and Stanley
do not report means and standard deviations.
8We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions. This publication was
made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary / Thrive Center in
concert with the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton
Foundation.
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